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ABSTRACT 
 
Ian Pierce Cruise:  An Argument Against Motivational Internalism 
Under the direction of Russ Shafer-Landau 
 
 
 In my thesis, I argue against motivational judgment internalism, which is the claim that 
necessarily, if a person makes a sincere, first-personal moral judgment, then she is to some extent 
motivated to act in accordance with that judgment.  My argument is that motivational judgment 
internalism falls victim to a series of counterexamples, namely, (some of) those cases in which a 
person arrives at a moral judgment (a concluding judgment) on the basis of a process of 
reasoning from a different moral judgment (an initial judgment) and other of her background 
beliefs.  My claim is that people often fail to be motivated by the concluding judgments in these 
kinds of cases even when they are motivated by the initial judgments.  The evidence for this 
claim is that people often report not feeling motivated to act in accordance with the concluding 
judgments.  I capture the crucial features of this kind of case in a constraint on moral judgment 
that I call the closure principle on moral judgment and argue that this constraint is inconsistent 
with motivational judgment internalism.  Next, I consider the objection that one need not feel 
motivated to act in order to be motivated to act.  I argue against this objection by defending a 
phenomenological conception of motivation.  On this view, if one does not feel motivated to act, 
then one is not motivated to act.  Having dispensed with the objection, I conclude that we ought 
to reject motivational judgment internalism. 
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Section 1:  Introduction 
 
There’s an important claim, which can be traced back to Plato, that genuine knowledge of 
goodness and rightness is motivationally efficacious.  That is, one couldn’t have genuine 
knowledge that some act is good or right without thereby being motivated to perform it.  Plato 
himself makes an even stronger claim, namely, that the motivation in question must be 
overriding, which is to say that it invariably leads to action.1  Few contemporary philosophers 
endorse a view that strong.2  But this view does have a contemporary descendant:  Motivational 
Judgment Internalism (MJI).   
 MJI:  Necessarily, if an agent makes a sincere, first-personal moral judgment, then she is 
 at least to some extent motivated to act in accordance with that judgment.    
MJI is a thesis about (part of) what it is to be a moral judgment.3  The intuition driving 
MJI is pretty powerful.  Suppose that I tell you that I ought to refrain from torturing animals even 
though I regularly torture animals without either second thought or apparent compunction.  You 
would most naturally think that I’m simply being disingenuous in claiming that I ought not to 
torture animals.  I don’t really judge that I ought not to do it, or so you would likely think.  The 																																																								
1 Plato, Protagoras, in Plato:  Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 787. 
 
2 One philosopher who does is R.M. Hare.  See, R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), 169. 
 
3 This claim might not be obvious.  It is not standardly the case that when Y follows from X, Y is 
part of what it is to be X.  But the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation 
must hold in virtue of something.  It is surely implausible that this connection is metaphysically 
brute.  The most plausible place to look to explain this connection, then, is in the nature of moral 
judgment itself. 
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most natural conclusion to draw from this kind of case is that part of what it is to make a moral 
judgment is to be motivated to some extent to act in accordance with it, which supports MJI.   
The standard counterexample to MJI is the amoralist (a person who makes sincere moral 
judgments but is not at all motivated to act in accordance with them).  Defenders of motivational 
judgment externalism (MJE),4 which is standardly defined as the negation of MJI,5 need to argue 
that the amoralist is possible in order to undermine MJI.  Philosophers tend to have mixed 
intuitions about the possibility of such characters.  On the one hand, amoralists certainly seem 
conceivable:  I seem to be able to imagine a person who makes sincere moral judgments and yet 
is completely unmotivated to act accordingly.  I might even imagine that the person engages in 
moral argumentation and seems to have good reasons to support his or her views.6  But, on the 
other hand, we might wonder if the character I’m imagining is really making sincere moral 
judgments (recall the case of the animal torturer).  Perhaps the amoralist merely makes ‘moral 
judgments,’ which are superficially similar to genuine moral judgments but lack some essential 
feature.   
																																																								
4 Defenders of MJE include David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1989), 37-80; Sigrun Svavarsdóttir, “Moral 
Cognitivism and Motivation,” The Philosophical Review 108, no. 2 (1999):  161-219; Russ 
Shafer-Landau, “A Defense of Motivational Externalism,” Philosophical Studies 97, no. 3 
(2000):  267-291; Nick Zangwill, “Externalist Moral Motivation,” in Foundations of Ethics:  An 
Anthology, eds. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden:  Blackwell Publishing, 2003):  
243-251. 
 
5 Shafer-Landau defines MJE this way.  See, Russ Shafer-Landau, “Moral Judgement and 
Motivation,” The Philosophical Quarterly 48, no. 192:  353.  The trajectory of the debate over 
the precise way to formulate a plausible form of internalism would suggest that this is not, in 
fact, the best way to define MJE.  I will return to this issue in Section IV.   
 
6 For such an example, see Svavarsdóttir’s example of Patrick.  Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 176-
177 
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I worry that if we rely too heavily on intuitive judgments about cases of putative 
amoralism, this debate is bound to end in a stalemate.  In an attempt to overcome this hurdle, I 
will, in Section I, propose a constraint that any account of moral judgment must meet.  I will then 
argue that this constraint is inconsistent with MJI.  As will become clear, this discussion will 
raise questions about the nature of moral motivation.  In Section II, I will raise some objections 
to (what I take to be) a standard assumption about moral motivation.  This discussion will clear 
the way for a defense of MJE, which I undertake in Section III.  In Section IV, I will conclude by 
commenting on some recent developments in thinking about internalism, in particular, the 
variety of mitigated internalisms (weakened forms of internalism that attach various further 
conditions to the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation) that have been 
put forward in the last several years.7  
Section 2:  A Constraint on Moral Judgment 
 Suppose I judge that I ought to φ.  Suppose further that I believe that it follows from this 
judgment and my background beliefs that I ought to ψ and on this basis, I draw the conclusion 
that I ought to ψ.  In my view, if these suppositions hold, then I have judged that I ought to ψ.  I 
believe that it is a constraint on any account of moral judgment that it must account for this fact.  
I will call this the closure principle of moral judgment (CPMJ). 
 CPMJ:  If (a) I judge that I morally ought to φ, (b) I believe that it follows from my 
 background beliefs and this judgment that I morally ought to ψ, and (c) I conclude, on 
 this basis, that I ought to ψ, then I judge that I morally ought to ψ.   
 
A couple of terminological notes:  1) I will use the term “initial judgment” to denote the 
judgment that I ought to φ, and 2) I will use the term “concluding judgment” to denote the 
judgment that I ought to ψ.   																																																								
7 The term mitigated internalism comes from Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.  See, Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, “The Metaethical Problem,” Ethics 108, no. 1 (1997):  60. 
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The idea behind CPMJ is that a concluding judgment inherits its status as a moral 
judgment from the initial judgment.  Assuming that conditions (a)-(c) are met, then it is 
incoherent to call the initial judgment a moral judgment while denying that the concluding 
judgment is a moral judgment. 
 I think that this principle is intuitively plausible.  It captures an important means by 
which we often make moral judgments, namely, by reasoning our way to them from moral 
judgments that we’ve already made.  For example, without CPMJ, it would be difficult to explain 
how we arrive at specific moral judgments (“I ought to help Steve when he is in need”) on the 
basis of general moral judgments (“I ought to help those in need”).  But I want to make an even 
stronger claim.  I believe that CPMJ is analytic.  It seems to me that there is no difference, in this 
kind of case, between concluding that I ought to ψ and judging that I ought to ψ.  My contention 
is that if my initial judgment is a genuine moral judgment and the other conditions are met, then 
my concluding judgment is a genuine moral judgment as well.   
 In certain cases, CPMJ might seem too obvious to be of any substantive interest.  For 
example, if I judge that I ought to help others when they are in need, I believe that Steve is in 
need, and on this basis, I conclude that I ought to help Steve, then I have judged that I ought to 
help Steve.  However, this principle might seem to raise concerns for some simple forms of non-
cognitivism (the view that moral judgments express a non-cognitive state such as a desire rather 
than a cognitive states such as a belief), since it seems to raise the specter of the Frege-Geach 
problem.8  In particular, supposing a non-cognitive analysis of moral judgments for the moment, 
at one point in the reasoning process, my initial judgment expresses a non-cognitive state, but at 
																																																								
8 For the original statement of the Frege-Geach problem, see P.T. Geach, “Assertion,” The 
Philosophical Review 74, no. 4 (1965):  449-465. 
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another, it appears in an embedded context9 in which it does not similarly function to express a 
non-cognitive state.  Because the judgment functions in two different ways in the reasoning 
process, the implication from judging that I ought to φ to judging that I ought to ψ doesn’t seem 
to go through.  The Frege-Geach worry is that this kind of reasoning seems perfectly acceptable, 
so if the non-cognitivist view can’t make sense of why this reasoning is justifiable, then so much 
the worse for non-cognitivism.   
 Moving forward, I will assume that any account of moral judgment must explain why this 
kind of reasoning is acceptable.  Perhaps some very simple forms of non-cognitivism fail in this 
regard, but I want to leave open the possibility that some more sophisticated forms of non-
cognitivism can provide an adequate explanation.  However, the important point is that it seems 
that CPMJ might simply be a way of capturing what we are supposed to conclude from Frege-
Geach worries about non-cognitivism.  If one thinks that an account of moral judgment has to be 
able to accommodate Frege-Geach worries, then that account is going to have to accept CPMJ.  
Let me explain why.   
 Here is the form of an argument that I might make: 
1. I morally ought to φ. 
2. X, Y, and Z. 
3. If I morally ought to φ and X, Y, and Z, then I morally ought to ψ. 
4. Therefore, I morally ought to ψ. 
																																																								
9 In particular, in the following claim:  If I ought to help others when they are in need and Steve 
is in need, then I ought to help Steve.  In order for this conditional to be truth apt and so for the 
argument to be valid, “I ought to help others when they are in need”  
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(1) is a moral judgment.  (2) is the content of some set of relevant background beliefs.  
(3) is the claim that “I ought to ψ” follows from (1) and (2).  (4) is my conclusion reached on the 
basis of (1), (2), and (3).  It follows from CPMJ that (4) is a moral judgment as well.   
 Frege-Geach worries arise because, for non-cognitivists, moral judgments function 
differently in different parts of an argument, particularly in embedded and unembedded contexts.  
The initial judgment is in an unembedded context in (1) and an embedded context in (3).  The 
function of the initial judgment in (1), on a non-cognitivist analysis, is to express a non-cognitive 
state.  The function of the initial judgment in (3), however, is different because the non-cognitive 
analysis applies only to moral judgments that appear in asserted contexts.  When a moral 
judgment is embedded in a conditional, it is not in an asserted context.  But in order for the 
argument to be valid, we need moral judgments to play the same role at every place in which 
they appear in the argument.  For this reason, it wouldn’t make sense for something other than a 
moral judgment to be the conclusion of this argument.  That is precisely what CPMJ seeks to 
capture.   
 What I hope to have shown at this point is that if one is convinced that Frege-Geach 
worries are legitimate worries, then one should endorse CPMJ.  I also believe that CPMJ has a 
great deal of intuitive plausibility, so I propose now to move away from arguing in its favor and 
turn to one of its important implications.  To that end, let me start with a couple examples.   
 Charity:  Suppose I judge that I morally ought to wade into shallow ponds to save 
 drowning children, even if by doing so I would ruin my $100 pair of shoes.  
 Suppose further that Peter Singer has convinced me that there is no morally 
 significant difference between this situation and the situation in which I could donate 
 $100 to an effective charity, which would use the money to save the life of a child in 
 need.  I affirm that it follows from my initial judgment and this belief that I ought to 
 donate $100 to this effective charity and on this basis, I conclude that I ought to donate 
 the $100.  By CPMJ, I judge that I morally ought to donate the money.   
Vegetarianism:  Suppose I judge that I morally ought not to do anything that would cause 
avoidable pain to unwilling sentient creatures.  I believe that by eating meat, I am 
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contributing to a practice that causes avoidable pain in sentient creatures.  I affirm that it 
follows from this judgment and this belief that I ought not to eat meat and on this basis, I 
conclude that I ought not to eat meat.  By CPMJ, I judge that I morally ought not to eat 
meat.   
 
CPMJ tells us that in both Charity and Vegetarianism, I reason my way to a moral 
judgment.  While (it seems to me that) moral judgments are often made in response to affective 
(often motivational) states, the judgments in these cases are not like that.  To see the contrast, 
consider the phenomenology of moral judgments in cases of the sort I have presented here 
compared with cases such as Gilbert Harman’s cat burning case.10  In that case, I turn the corner 
only to see a group of teenagers setting a cat on fire.  I judge that what they are doing is wrong, 
but my judgment is not the conclusion of a process of reasoning.  Rather, my moral judgment is a 
response to a feeling of moral horror.  This feeling, it seems to me, often has motivational force.  
I might, for example, feel compelled to scream at the kids to stop what they are doing or throw a 
bucket of water on the cat or even put it out of its misery.  Conclusions of a process of reasoning 
do not usually produce such intense responses.  Thus, it seems to me that the phenomenology of 
moral judgment is different in different kinds of cases because the causal process that leads to a 
moral judgment is different in different cases.  Some moral judgments spring directly from 
affective, often motivational states.  Others result from cool and calm reasoning processes.11   
																																																								
10 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality:  An Introduction to Ethics (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1977):  4. 
 
11 Antti Kauppinen makes a similar point.  See Antti Kauppinen, “Intuition and Belief in Moral 
Motivation,” in Motivational Internalism, eds. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar 
Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2015):  237-259.  His claim is that some moral judgments spring from what he calls intuitions, 
which are sentimental, motivating mental states.  Others spring from what he calls beliefs, which 
are not necessarily motivational.   
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This contrast is important because it serves to highlight an important point about both 
Charity and Vegetarianism, namely, that it seems possible (and even fairly common) to be 
motivationally affected by the initial judgments and yet be completely unmoved by the 
concluding judgments.  But notice that if this is indeed possible, then MJI can’t be true.  In both 
Charity and Vegetarianism, I reason my way to a sincere, first-personal moral judgment that may 
have no motivational impact. 
One popular response from a defender of MJI is to suggest that the concluding judgments 
in these cases are not really moral judgments; rather, they are ‘moral judgments.’12  Different 
philosophers cash out this claim in different ways, but the core of the claim seems to be that a 
‘moral judgment’ is simply a failed attempt at a moral judgment.  On Michael Smith’s 
interpretation of the claim, the agent who makes such a judgment lacks the relevant concepts 
necessary to make a moral judgment.  One problem with this objection is that it seems odd and 
ad hoc to grant that the initial judgment is a genuine moral judgment while denying that the 
concluding judgment is.  The claim would have to be that I lost conceptual competence at some 
point during the reasoning process, which is implausible.  My suggestion is that if I’m 
conceptually competent enough to make a genuine moral judgment in the one case, then I’m 
conceptually competent enough to make a genuine moral judgment in the other case as well.    
The other response is to resist my interpretation of the cases.  In particular, one might 
argue that though I don’t feel any sort of motivation to act in accordance with my concluding 
judgments, nonetheless it might still be the case that I am motivated, albeit to a very small 
degree.  The truth of MJI depends only on the claim that I am motivated at least to some extent.  
																																																								
12 See Hare (1964), p. 124 and Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Malden:  Blackwell 
Publishing, 1994):  67.   
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So if I am motivated to a very small degree, then MJI is not threatened by the considerations that 
I have advanced.  In the next section, I will explore this critique.   
Section 3:  The Nature of Moral Motivation 
 The goal of this section is to defend a conception of motivation capable of overcoming 
the objection raised at the end of the last section.  I will first outline an influential account of 
motivation and contrast it with my preferred account.  I will then criticize the influential account 
and suggest that my preferred account is not similarly subject to these criticisms, which gives us 
some reason to accept my account and reject the influential account.  Next, I will argue that my 
preferred account can overcome the objection raised at the end of the last section.  My 
conclusion is that because we have reason to accept my account and it can answer this objection, 
my argument from the last section stands, which means that we ought to reject MJI.  I will 
conclude by considering the criticism that my account of motivation captures a different 
phenomenon from the one that philosophers engaged in the internalism/externalism debate are 
interested in.   
For the purposes of this essay, I will only consider moral motivation as motivation to act 
morally.  We could properly use the term “moral motivation” to refer to the motivation to 
cultivate certain character traits or to come to have certain beliefs, but, for simplicity, I will only 
talk about the motivation to act morally.  Moral motivation, in this sense, is simply a type of 
motivation, so in order to understand what moral motivation is, we need to ask what motivation 
more generally is.   
 The usual starting point for a discussion of motivation is the Humean theory of 
motivation.  According to this theory, to be motivated to φ is to satisfy two independently 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: 
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1. One must desire to ψ. 
2. One must have the means-end belief that by φing, one will bring it about that one ψs.13 
The important feature of this view is that motivation consists in having a desire and an 
appropriately related means-end belief.  For example, if I desire ice cream and I believe that by 
going to the store I could get some ice cream, I am thereby motivated to go to the store.   
 Let me clarify this view by expanding on a couple points.  The first point is that 
motivation need not lead all the way to action.  In the ice cream example, I might simultaneously 
also desire to lose some weight and believe that not eating ice cream is a good way to do so.  If 
my desire to lose weight is stronger than my desire to eat ice cream, then my motivation to go to 
the store to get some ice cream may not lead to action.  But it is still correct to say that I was 
somewhat motivated to go to the store.   
 The second point is that this theory of motivation, in and of itself, is silent on what a 
desire is.  There are, of course, many theories of desire.  Michael Smith, a defender of the 
Humean theory of motivation, argues for a dispositional account of desire.  On this view, to say 
																																																								
13 This statement of the Humean Theory of Motivation comes from Michael Smith.  See Michael 
Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind 96, no. 381 (1987):  36 and Smith (1994), p. 
92.  This presentation brushes aside a few complexities.  For example, in some cases, φ equals ψ.  
If I have an intrinsic desire to look at the prothonotary warbler and I believe that the bird outside 
my window is such a warbler, then I am motivated to look at that bird.  I might also have desires 
for more general things like being happy.  No act of mine, in itself, fully constitutes my being 
happy, but any number of actions of mine might be described as the means of achieving 
happiness or perhaps ways of realizing the end of being happy.  The point is simply that the 
Humean Theory is a little bit more complex than Smith’s statement would suggest, but not in any 
way that is incompatible with what he has to say.  In any case, I won’t be picking on these 
complexities in what follows.   
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that I desire an apple is to say that I am disposed to act so as to get an apple.14  I need not in fact 
act so as to get an apple.  Perhaps I desire a banana even more on this occasion.    
 Smith contrasts his account with what he calls the phenomenological conception of 
desire.  On this account, a desire is constituted essentially by feelings of certain kinds.  His best 
argument against this view, in my judgment, is that this kind of account cannot explain long-term 
desires, such as the desire that one’s wife be happy.  While this desire might manifest itself in 
feelings at certain times (when one could do something in particular to make one’s wife happy, 
for example), it is implausible to claim that the desire simply goes out of existence in the 
intervening period between these occasions.  
 Smith’s own account does seem to be in a good position to explain our desires in this 
kind of case.  A disposition to act (much less its underlying state) need not involve any particular 
feelings.  It might, but it need not.  He concludes that we should accept his view and reject the 
phenomenological account. 
 I’m inclined to agree with Smith that we should reject the phenomenological conception 
of desire.  However, because Smith pairs this conception of desire with the Humean theory of 
motivation (which, recall, adds to a desire only a relevant means-end belief to explain 
motivation), he also rejects what we might call the phenomenological conception of motivation, 
which, in a nutshell, states that it is a necessary condition on X’s being motivated to φ that X 
feels motivated to φ.  In the rest of this section, I will try to provide some reason to accept the 																																																								
14 One objection to this theory of desire is that it seems to lose the sense in which a desire is a 
mental state.  A plant or a (sufficiently unsophisticated) robot (such as a Roomba) could be 
disposed to act in certain ways, but we would not want to attribute desires to these kinds of 
beings.  Smith fills in some details for us.  For example, he describes the mental state in question 
as a functional state “that grounds all sorts of his dispositions” (1987, p. 52).  But it is still 
unclear whether filling these details helps.  There doesn’t seem to be any good reason to deny 
that plants or Roombas can’t have functional states that ground their dispositions to act.  In any 
case, my argument in the rest of the essay will not depend on solving this problem.    
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phenomenological conception of motivation and use it to defend my rejection of MJI against the 
objection raised at the end of Section I.   
 The key feature of the phenomenological conception of motivation that I will defend is 
that a necessary condition of motivation is a phenomenological component.  Absent this 
phenomenological component, a purported case of motivation wouldn’t be a case of motivation 
at all.  In essence, the phenomenological conception of motivation takes the Humean theory of 
motivation and simply adds another condition, namely, a phenomenological component. 
 To make the view more explicit, I need to say what this phenomenological component is.  
To begin, it is a feeling (broadly construed) of a certain kind.  I could characterize this feeling as 
an impulse or pull, but the term I will use is inclination.  The term “inclination” might carry with 
it a certain amount of philosophical baggage, so let me state more precisely how I’ll be using the 
term.  On my view, for X to have an inclination to φ is for X to feel attracted to, pulled by, or 
otherwise moved to φ.  The term is meant to capture the feeling of being drawn to φ.  The feeling 
is most pronounced in cases in which a person has contrary motivations.  In these kinds of cases, 
one can feel the inclination to φ while at the same time feeling the inclination to ψ.  For example, 
I often have an internal struggle when I am trying to diet and I am presented with the opportunity 
to eat a piece of cake.  In this case, I have contrary motivations (to eat cake and to stick to my 
diet).  When I reflect on what is going on psychologically, I can pick out two motivations by the 
inclination that I experience to perform each action.   
 In cases in which I do not have contrary motivations, the inclination is often (though not 
always, of course) less pronounced.  My motivation to watch a movie after a long day doesn’t 
usually manifest itself in any particularly strong inclination, but nonetheless I feel at least some 
inclination.  It manifests itself as the impulse to experience relief from the pressures of the day.   
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 One might resist this view by pointing to purported cases in which an inclination is 
completely absent and yet I nonetheless act.  And because I acted, I must have been motivated to 
act, so the phenomenological account cannot be correct.  I would think that the most natural 
candidates for such cases are those everyday, routine activities that most of us perform pretty 
mindlessly.  When I make my morning coffee, for example, I don’t really feel any inclination to 
turn the machine on or grind the beans.  I just do it.   
 I grant that I don’t directly feel an inclination to do such things, but I would resist the 
conclusion by arguing that in these cases my motivation is to achieve the end in question 
(namely, to drink my morning coffee15), and I do feel the inclination to achieve the end.  To 
make the point, let me distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental motivation.  Intrinsic 
motivation is motivation to φ for its own sake.  Instrumental motivation is motivation to φ as a 
means of achieving the end of ψing.  On my view, instrumental motivation is always parasitic on 
intrinsic motivation.  That is, if I weren’t motivated to achieve some end, I wouldn’t be 
motivated to take the means to that end.  We shouldn’t expect that I would feel an independent 
inclination to do what I am merely instrumentally motivated to do.  The inclination to do what 
I’m instrumentally motivated to do is nothing over and above the inclination to do what I’m 
intrinsically motivated to do.  For this reason, we shouldn’t expect that I’d feel an independent 
inclination to grind the beans for my coffee.  The only inclination relevant to motivation in this 
case is the inclination to drink my coffee.  Thus, I think that the objector is correct that I don’t 
feel an inclination to grind the beans but incorrect to suggest that this threatens the 
phenomenological conception of motivation.  We can explain the instrumental motivation to 																																																								
15 Some might prefer to specify the end as the experience of the flavor of coffee in my mouth or 
perhaps the pleasure I get from the coffee or something along those lines.  I’m going to stick 
with describing the end as drinking my coffee, but if the reader would prefer to specify it in a 
different way, then insert your preference in the relevant place.   
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grind the beans in terms of the intrinsic motivation to drink my coffee.  I believe that necessarily 
one feels an inclination to do what one is intrinsically motivated to do, and this is sufficient to 
explain the connection between the phenomenological component of motivation and the apparent 
lack of this phenomenological component in cases of instrumental motivation.   
 A final point about the phenomenological conception of motivation is that lots of 
philosophers working on moral judgment and motivation seem to presuppose something like it, 
even (in some cases) when they explicitly endorse contrary views.  In particular, a number of 
philosophers resist MJI by claiming that people who are weak of will, depressed, or 
psychologically abnormal in some other way sometimes make sincere, first-personal moral 
judgments but, because of their psychological condition, fail to be motivated.16  The primary 
evidence for this conclusion is that the subjects of these psychological failings do not report 
feeling any inclination to act.  If these philosophers subscribed to the Humean theory of 
motivation and the dispositional account of desire that Smith builds into it, then this would not 
be very good evidence for the claim in question.  After all, on that view, feeling an inclination to 
act is not a necessary feature of motivation, so the fact that the agent does not feel an inclination 
to act in accordance with her judgment is completely irrelevant.  Surprisingly, even Michael 
Smith, who defends the Humean theory of motivation and the dispositional account of desire, 
claims that we ought to reject MJI on the grounds that it makes weakness of will impossible.17  
The only point I wish to make with this observation is that the phenomenological account of 
																																																								
16 See, for example, Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad:  An Essay in Moral Psychology,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 12 (1979):  738-753; Smith (1994), p. 61; Alfred Mele, “Internalist 
Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,” Ethics 106, no. 4 (1996):  727-753, and Svavarsdóttir 
(1999), pp. 163-164. 
 
17 Smith (1994), p. 61. 
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motivation, though it has few explicit defenders, seems to structure the way a number of 
philosophers think about the nature of motivation. 
 I will now leave my direct characterization of the phenomenological conception of 
motivation and turn to its relationship to MJI.  Recall the objection to my interpretation of 
Charity and Vegetarianism above.  I suggested that these cases fit CPMJ and so the concluding 
moral judgments in each case count as genuine moral judgments.  I also proposed that it is 
plausible that these concluding moral judgments do not necessarily entail motivation to act in 
accordance with them.  I raised an objection to this view according to which the standard for 
motivation is quite minimal, so it might be the case that I am to some small extent motivated 
even in cases in which I wouldn’t report feeling motivated.  If I am even to a small extent 
motivated in these cases, then MJI is safe from my criticism.  I now turn to an elaboration of and 
response to this objection.   
In a recent defense of MJI, Daniel Eggers argues that we have reason to accept MJI 
because the motivation condition is quite minimal.18  The condition, after all, is merely that a 
person need be only to some extent motivated to act in accordance with her first-personal moral 
judgments.  Because the condition is so minimal, we should resist the description of several of 
the cases meant to serve as counterexamples to MJI.  For example, as I already noted, it is often 
claimed that conditions such as weakness of will, depression, and other psychological 
abnormalities undermine MJI.  Eggers claims that we cannot rely on the self-reports of the 
subjects of these conditions to determine whether they are, in fact, motivated.   
																																																								
18 Daniel Eggers, “Unconditional Motivational Internalism and Hume’s Lesson,” in Motivational 
Internalism, eds. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, 
and Fredrik Björklund (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2015):  85-107. 
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In support of this claim, he adapts an argument against psychological egoism from Hume.  
Hume claims that we can test the plausibility of psychological egoism by imagining a situation in 
which a selfish person is given the choice between bringing about the prosperity or utter 
destruction of some foreign nation.19  We have to imagine that the person given this choice will 
stand neither to gain nor lose anything from the outcome of her choice.  He argues that while we 
can imagine a monstrous person who would remain indifferent, most human beings as we 
understand them, no matter how selfish, would not remain indifferent.  A human being would 
always choose to bring about the prosperity of the foreign nation.  The only way to explain this 
choice is to posit the existence of non-egoistic motives, motives that, according to the self-
proclaimed egoist, don’t exist. 
Eggers proposes a similar test for our moral motives.  Suppose that I judge that I ought to 
φ.  There might seem to be situations (for example, when I am depressed) in which I would not 
feel any inclination to φ despite my judgment that I ought to.  According to Eggers, this situation 
does not yet undermine MJI because my motivations might not be accessible to me at the 
moment that I make this judgment just as my altruistic motivations might not be accessible to me 
in most everyday situations.  The way to bring out these motivations, on Eggers’s view, is to 
place me into a highly contrived choice situation such as the one Hume describes.  Let’s imagine 
the depressed (or weak-willed or…) version of me but this time, we make φing very easy for me, 
as simple as pressing a button.  Eggers claims that we would expect even the depressed version 
of me to φ in this situation.  We are therefore entitled to conclude that I am to some (small) 
extent motivated to φ, even if I don’t feel motivated at all.   
																																																								
19 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J.B. Schneewind 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1983):  52. 
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Eggers’s argument seems to me to necessitate rejecting the phenomenological conception 
of motivation because on his view, I could be motivated to φ even if I have no inclination to φ.  
But according to the phenomenological conception of motivation, the inclination is necessary for 
motivation.  Thus, Eggers must reject the phenomenological conception of motivation.  He 
doesn’t explicitly defend a theory of motivation, but the most natural way to interpret what he’s 
saying is in terms of a theory of motivation like Smith’s, namely, a theory that explains 
motivation in terms of dispositions.  If I merely pass Eggers’s test for moral motivation, then I 
have a disposition (albeit, a rather weak one) to φ.  The reason is simply that there are 
circumstances under which I would φ.  If there are such circumstances, then that is enough to 
attribute to me motivation.   
This discussion suggests an interesting (and, I think, implausible) consequence of the 
theory of motivation defended by Smith and implicit in Eggers.  It is possible, on this view, to be 
motivated to φ even if one never feels drawn to φ, is completely unaware that one desires to φ, 
and never, in fact, φs.  In other words, I could at this moment and for all times be motivated to do 
something that I am unaware that I’m motivated to do, will never be aware that I’m motivated to 
do, and will never in fact do.  It seems to me that motivation must have a stronger connection 
with action than this kind of case would suggest.  For this reason, I would propose that the way 
to forge this stronger connection is to build in a phenomenological component to motivation.   
Another problem with the theory of motivation defended by Smith and Eggers is that it 
cannot explain whimsical motivations.  I might do something on a whim without it being the 
case that I am disposed to do it.  I might, for example, have the sudden urge to do a cartwheel 
while walking down the street.  But my urge to do a cartwheel need not (and in most cases, I 
would think, should not) be explained by pointing to some disposition that I have to do 
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cartwheels while walking down the street.  The best explanation of my motivation to do a 
cartwheel in this case is that I have a sudden, fleeting inclination to do it.  Thus, it seems to me 
that, again, the phenomenological conception of motivation can explain a feature of motivation 
that the dispositional version of the Humean theory cannot.     
 In Section I, I argued for CPMJ and suggested that when we apply this principle to cases 
such as Charity and Vegetarianism, we get some reason to reject MJI.  I also raised an objection 
to this claim, namely, that my interpretation of the cases is flawed because my interpretation 
relies on the suggestion that having an inclination to φ is necessary for being motivated to φ.  In 
particular, one might argue that though I don’t feel motivated to act in accordance with my 
judgment, I might nonetheless be motivated.  If my argument for the phenomenological 
conception of motivation works, then we have reason to dismiss this objection.  If I do not feel 
motivated to act in accordance with my judgment, then I am not motivated to act in accordance 
with my judgment.  I conclude that if CPMJ and the phenomenological conception of motivation 
are both true, then we ought to reject MJI.  
 One might object to the argument I’ve just made by claiming that Smith and Eggers are 
simply referring to a different phenomenon than I am when they use the term “motivation.”  
Eggers makes this suggestion.20  Perhaps the relevant distinction is between being motivated to 
do something (which I have suggested requires a phenomenological component) and having a 
motive to do something, which simply involves having a disposition to do it, which itself simply 
amounts to being motivated to do it under certain possible circumstances.  With this distinction 
in place, we might reformulate MJI as the claim that necessarily, if a person makes a sincere, 
																																																								
20 Eggers (2015), p. 90. 
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first-personal moral judgment that she ought to φ, then she has a motive to φ (call this “Weak 
MJI”).   
One attraction of Weak MJI for those who want to defend MJI is that it still forges a 
necessary connection between moral judgment and the motivational system of the agent who 
makes the judgment.   Moreover, objections to MJI that depend on phenomena such as weakness 
of will and depression have no purchase against Weak MJI.  Or, at the least, the justification for 
the claim that these phenomena undermine MJI (namely, that the agents in question feel no 
motivation to act in accordance with their judgments) does not equally serve to undermine Weak 
MJI because Weak MJI does not require that an agent who makes a moral judgment be 
motivated, in the sense just outlined, to act in accordance with it.   
I think that even Weak MJI is false.  To see why, let’s consider Charity again.  Even if 
someone wanted to resist the claim that I do not have a motive to act in accordance with the 
concluding judgment (that I ought to donate $100 to charity), it seems to me that anyone would 
have to grant that it is possible for the motive to act in accordance with the initial judgment (that 
I ought to save the child drowning in the pond) to be much stronger than the concluding 
judgment.  But if it is true that the motive to act in accordance with each judgment can vary in 
strength, then that already suggests a metaphysical distinction between the system by which we 
make moral judgments and the motivational system.  If the two systems were metaphysically 
intertwined in the way that both MJI and Weak MJI require, then we should expect the initial and 
final judgments in any instance of CPMJ to have similar motivational impacts.  But what we 
actually find is a great deal of variation.  We should conclude from these observations that the 
two systems are indeed metaphysically distinct.   
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Because these two systems are metaphysically distinct, we should conclude that (barring 
some very strong argument to the contrary) it is possible for them to operate independently of 
one another.  That is, it seems odd and a bit ad hoc to make the following two claims:  1) One 
might be very strongly motivated to act in accordance with an initial judgment and only to a very 
small extent motivated to act in accordance with a concluding judgment, and 2) It is impossible 
for one to fail altogether to have a motive to act in accordance with a final judgment.  Why not 
allow that a person could fail to be motivated at all, unless simply to preserve MJI?21  The same 
reasoning would suggest that it is possible to make a sincere, first-personal moral judgment and 
fail to have a motive to act in accordance with it.  But if that is possible, then Weak MJI can’t be 
true.22   
Section 4:  Defending MJE 
 In this short section, I wish to highlight the ways in which a defender of MJE can explain 
the phenomena that I have been arguing cause troubles for MJI.  Let’s start with CPMJ.  
According to MJE, any connection that exists between moral judgment and motivation is 
																																																								
21 Svavarsdóttir makes a similar argument.  See, Sigrun Svavarsdóttir, “Detecting Value and 
Motivational Responses,” in Motivational Internalism, eds. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, 
Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2015):  213-236. 
 
22 One might naturally wonder why I wouldn’t simply develop this argument against Weak MJI 
further since it undermines MJI as well.  Why bother spending so much time getting clear on 
what it is to be motivated if some philosophers aren’t operating with the same conception of 
motivation?  Part of the reason is to highlight the fact that different philosophers are operating 
with different conceptions of motivation and so often seem to be talking past one another.  For 
instance, those who think that phenomena such as weakness of will and depression undermine 
MJI can’t be operating with a Humean conception of motivation.  Thus, when a philosopher who 
tacitly assumes a phenomenological conception of motivation and a Humean claim to have 
different intuitions about putative cases of amoralism, part of the difference in intuition might be 
explained by the fact that each is operating with the different conception of motivation.  I also 
think that distinguishing between being motivated and having a motive helps us to get clear on 
precisely what the best characterization of the internalist position is supposed to be.    
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contingent.  Thus, it is neither here nor there as far as the defender of MJE is concerned whether 
I am motivated to act in accordance with my concluding judgment.  The defender of MJE can 
accept CPMJ without any problem.   
 There is also no tension at all between MJE and the phenomenological conception of 
motivation.  The reason is simply that MJE involves no commitments at all about the nature of 
motivation except that it cannot be necessarily connected with sincere, first-personal moral 
judgments.  Nothing about the phenomenological conception of motivation necessitates such a 
connection. 
 Finally, MJE can explain why initial and concluding judgments often result in 
motivations of vastly different strengths.  Because MJE involves a metaphysical separation of the 
judgment and motivational systems, it is not surprising, if MJE is true, that we see this variation 
in strength.  Of course, the defender of MJE still owes us an explanation for the obvious and 
often quite close connection between moral judgment and motivation, but the standard form that 
this explanation takes is at least initially plausible, namely, that moral motivation is a function of 
a desire to be moral or to do the right thing.  Given the initial plausibility of this view and the 
fact that MJE is capable of explaining the other features highlighted in this section, we have 
good reason to accept MJE and reject MJI.   
Section 5:  MJE and Mitigated Internalism 
 Readers familiar with the debate about internalism and externalism about moral 
judgments and motivation over the last 20 or 30 years might find everything I’ve said up to this 
point a bit puzzling.  Very few philosophers actually defend MJI anymore, after all.  Instead, 
most philosophers endorse some sort of weakened or mitigated internalism.  So why focus on 
MJI rather than one or more of the mitigated versions of internalism? 
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 There are a couple answers to this question.  The first is that, as I have tried to emphasize, 
I think that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss MJI.  The usual reasons to reject MJI 
(that it can’t make sense of absent motivation in light of weakness of will, depression, and other 
psychological abnormalities) are good reasons to dismiss MJI only if one tacitly assumes 
something like the phenomenological conception of motivation.  Though I have defended this 
view, I recognize that it is controversial and much more needs to be said in its defense.  
Defenders of MJI would do well to revisit these objections to their view and consider their 
plausibility in light of the theory of motivation they wish to defend.   
 Another reason to focus on MJI is that it plays an important role in an argument for non-
cognitivism about moral judgments.  The argument works as follows.  Only desires can function 
to motivate a person to act.  Necessarily, if a person makes a sincere, first-personal moral 
judgment, then she is to some extent motivated to act in accordance with it.  Thus, moral 
judgments are motivationally efficacious.  It follows that moral judgments are not beliefs but 
rather expressive of some motivating state.  Therefore, non-cognitivism is true.  In this essay, I 
have argued that we ought to reject MJI, which has the benefit (for cognitivists like me) of 
simultaneously undermining this argument for non-cognitivism.   
 The important point is that the truth or falsity of MJI seems to have important 
implications for moral metaphysics.  By contrast, it is not clear that anything especially 
important for moral metaphysics depends on the outcome of the debate between defenders of 
MJE and defenders of various forms of mitigated internalism.  Nonetheless, there is still some 
philosophical interest in precisely characterizing the relationship between moral judgments and 
motivation.  In what follows, I seek only to explain the precise differences between MJE and a 
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couple forms of mitigated internalism and indicate which philosophical issues would need to be 
settled to determine which view to accept.   
  But first and most importantly, I need to explain what the difference between MJE and 
mitigated internalism is.  At the beginning of this essay, I defined MJE as the negation of MJI.  
The problem with this definition is that every form of mitigated internalism entails the negation 
of MJI, so by my definition, mitigated internalists endorse MJE.  Mitigated internalists would not 
accept being lumped together with externalists, so it is worth recharacterizing the externalist 
view.  To see how to do that, it makes sense to define a few forms of mitigated internalism first.  
There are two broad varieties of mitigated internalism.  The first is conditional internalism, 
which attaches to MJI some additional condition(s): 
 Conditional internalism:  Necessarily, if a person makes a sincere, first-personal moral 
 judgment, then she is at least to some extent motivated to act in accordance with it if she 
 is in condition C. 
 
Condition C varies from view to view.  A few examples of the condition that have been 
defended include practical rationality, psychological normality, and, in a recent essay, taking the 
participatory stance towards one’s own deliberations.  In what follows, I’ll focus exclusively on 
the first to simplify the discussion.23   
The second form of mitigated internalism is deferred internalism, which requires that any 
motivationally inefficacious moral judgment be relevantly connected with a motivationally 
efficacious moral judgment whether by being a judgment that a person made earlier in her life or 
a judgment made by some member(s) of her community: 																																																								
23 Christine Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 
1 (1986):  5-25; Smith (1994), p. 61; Kate Manne, “Tempered Internalism and the Participatory 
Stance,” in Motivational Internalism, eds. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén 
Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2015):  260-
281. 
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 Deferred internalism:  Necessarily, if a person makes a sincere, first-personal moral 
 judgment, M, then (i) she is at least to some extent motivated to act in accordance with M 
 or (ii) some moral judgments that are relevantly connected with M are accompanied by 
 motivation.24, 25 
 
 On both of these views, some moral judgments do have a necessary connection with 
motivation, but not all do.  For instance, according to one form of conditional internalism, there 
is no necessary connection between the moral judgments of practically irrational agents and 
motivation, but there is a necessary connection between the moral judgments of practically 
rational agents and motivation.  According to deferred internalism, there is no necessary 
connection between any single moral judgment and motivation, but there is a necessary 
connection between any single moral judgment and some other moral judgments, which must be 
themselves necessarily connected with motivation.  With these two views in mind, we might 
define a contrasting view that we can call Strong MJE. 
 Strong MJE:  No moral judgments have a necessary connection with motivation.  The 
 connection is always contingent.26 																																																								
24 Defenders of deferred internalism include James Dreier, “Internalism and Speaker 
Relativism,” Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990):  6-26; Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions:  A Theory of 
Practical Reasoning (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998):  61; and John Tresan, “The 
Challenge of Communal Internalism,” Journal of Value Inquiry 42, no. 2 (2009):  179-199.  For 
objections to this view, see Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder, “Internalists 
Beware—we Might all be Amoralists!” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 1 (2013), pp. 
1-14. 
 
25 I take the names and characterizations of these two classes of views from Gunnar Björnsson, 
Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund, “Motivational 
Internalism:  Contemporary Debates,” in Motivational Internalism, eds. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj 
Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2015):  1-26.   
 
26 Here one might wish to distinguish moral judgment qua mental state and moral judgment qua 
proposition.  On the one hand, if one thinks of moral judgments as mental states, then the 
contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation is going to have to be explained 
in psychological terms.  That is, if one can show that the psychological mechanisms that give rise 
to moral judgments are always merely contingently connected to the psychological mechanisms 
that give rise to motivation, then one has successfully defended Strong MJE.  On the other hand, 
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 In the debate between defenders of the form of conditional internalism according to 
which condition C is practical rationality and Strong MJE, the central question is whether a 
person can coherently reject the rational authority of morality.  That is, can a person make moral 
judgments and fail to be motivated without being irrational?  Conditional internalists often argue 
in the negative as follows.  To judge that I ought to φ is to judge that I have a reason to φ.  To 
judge that I have a reason to φ is to judge that I would φ if I were fully rational (because a 
rational agent just is a being that acts in accordance with its reasons).  Thus, if I judge that I 
ought to φ and fail to be motivated, I am irrational by my own lights.27 
 An externalist might resist this argument in a number of ways.  One way to resist the 
argument is to deny that moral judgments are judgments about reasons.  Another way to resist 
the argument is to deny that judgments about reasons are judgments about what one would do 
were one fully rational.  One might, for instance, defend a more modest theory of practical 																																																																																																																																																																																		
if one thinks of moral judgments as propositions, then the task of defending Strong MJE is in 
some ways more complex and in some ways simpler.  It is more complex in that one needs an 
independent argument for cognitivism because if moral judgments are merely expressive of non-
cognitive states, then they are not propositions at all.  But the task is also simpler because if one 
can produce an independent argument for cognitivism, then defending Strong MJE is as simple 
as pointing out that it is a contingent fact that anyone believes any particular proposition.  If no 
one believes some moral proposition, then there is of course no necessary connection between 
that proposition and motivation.   
 
27 Smith (1994), p. 62.  A similar argument formed the backbone of the case for MJI in the early 
and middle parts of the 20th century.  That argument works as follows.  Moral judgments are 
judgments about reasons.  To judge that one has a reason to act is to be motivated to act.  
Therefore, to make a moral judgment is to be motivated to act.  William Frankena, an early critic 
of this argument, suggests that it trades on an ambiguity in the word “reason.”  Some reasons, 
motivating reasons, do seem to have a necessary connection with action.  But other reasons, 
justifying reasons, don’t.  The argument seems to depend on reasons in the former sense, but, 
plausibly, moral judgments are judgments about reasons in the latter sense.  Thus, judgments of 
reasons don’t necessarily motivate.  See, William K. Frankena, “Obligation and Motivation in 
Recent Moral Philosophy,” in Metaethics:  Critical Concepts in Philosophy Vol. 1, ed. Russ 
Shafer-Landau (New York:  Routledge, 2008):  186-213. 
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rationality according to which practical rationality is nothing more than taking the means to 
one’s ends, whatever they happen to be.  On this view, I might judge that I have a reason to φ 
and yet not have φing as an end, and so not be irrational in not φing.28  
 This short presentation of the dialectic suggests that several issues need to be resolved in 
order to decide between Strong MJE and conditional internalism.  One question concerns the 
nature of reasons and, in particular, the nature of judgments about reasons.  Another concerns the 
question of whether moral judgments are judgments about reasons at all.  Finally, this debate 
cannot be settled without a defensible theory of practical rationality.  As a first pass, it seems to 
be the case that more modest theories of practical rationality favor Strong MJE while more 
substantive theories tend to favor conditional internalism.   
 In the debate between defenders of Strong MJE and deferred internalism, the primary 
question that arises concerns the ultimate source of our moral beliefs.  A defender of deferred 
internalism might argue as follows.  The ultimate source of our moral beliefs is our emotional 
reactions to moral phenomena.  These emotional reactions are intrinsically motivational, and 
without them, no one would have any moral beliefs at all.  But given that some people do have 
some moral beliefs because of these emotional reactions, they are able to “pass on” those beliefs 
to other members of the community.29  One way might simply be via testimony.  Another might 
be that the beliefs in question ground a series of publicly known norms of behavior.  Even if one 																																																								
28 I take it that this is how Philippa Foot responds to this kind of argument.  See, Philippa Foot, 
“Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972):  
310. 
 
29 We could say something similar about how I “pass on” moral beliefs from one time in my life 
to another (or from my earlier self to my present self, if you prefer such talk).  I might come to 
believe that I ought to φ on the basis of an emotional and inherently-motivational reaction to 
some situation but then later lose the motivation to act in accordance with that judgment.  
Nonetheless, I couldn’t possibly have come to the belief without having the emotional reaction in 
the first place.   
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didn’t care at all about morality, one might come to have moral beliefs by testimony or by 
participation in a society structured by moral norms.  But one could make these judgments only 
against the background of a number of emotionally-driven, “foundational” moral judgments, 
which are necessarily tied to motivation.   
 A defender of Strong MJE might respond as follows.  First, one might argue that 
emotional reactions are not the ultimate source of our moral beliefs.  Perhaps our foundational 
moral beliefs are the product of rational intuitions or some other not-necessarily-motivational 
source.  Another way to resist the argument is to deny that the emotional reactions are 
necessarily motivational.  When we consider particular emotions, we notice that not all of them 
are obviously connected with motivation.  Sadness, for example, doesn’t seem necessarily to 
motivate me to do anything.  In fact, sadness often seems to sap me of my motivation to do 
things.  But then again, other emotional reactions are strongly tied to motivation.  Fear, for 
example, is very strongly tied with an inclination to avoid or escape from the object of fear.  
With this in mind, the problem becomes one of identifying the emotions that ground moral 
judgments and determining whether those emotions are more like sadness or more like fear, at 
least in their motivational respects.   
 The dialectic between the defender of Strong MJE and deferred internalism can be settled 
only by settling two other crucial issues.  First, this issue hangs on a foundational question of 
moral epistemology:  Where do our moral beliefs come from?  What is their ultimate source?  
Sentimentalist accounts seem to favor deferred internalism while rationalist accounts seem to 
favor Strong MJE.  Second, if the sentimentalist account is correct, what kind of emotions are 
these moral emotions?  Are they necessarily motivational?   
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 I will close this section by reiterating that though the precise characterization of the 
relationship between moral judgment and motivation has few significant implications for moral 
metaphysics, nonetheless we need to solve a number of important issues in moral metaphysics 
and epistemology in order to offer such a characterization.   
Section 6:  Conclusion 
 The goal of this essay has been to argue that MJE is more plausible than MJI.  I began by 
proposing a constraint on any account of moral judgment, namely, CPMJ.  I then argued that MJI 
is committed to violations of this constraint while MJE isn’t.  The evidence for this claim is that 
it seems not just possible but also commonplace for people to fail to have an inclination to act in 
accordance with the moral judgments that they arrive at on the basis of reasoning.  One objection 
to this view is that one can be motivated to act even if one doesn’t have an inclination to act.  In 
order to deflect this objection, I then defended what I call the phenomenological conception of 
motivation.  If this conception of motivation is correct, then if one does not have an inclination to 
φ, then one is not motivated to φ.  My conclusion is that MJE is better able to capture a number 
of phenomena surrounding moral judgment and motivation than MJI, which gives us reason to 
accept MJE over MJI.   
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